Health care financing reform : a socio-economic perspective by HO, Lok Sang
Lingnan University
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Centre for Public Policy Studies : CPPS Working
Paper Series
Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究中
心
2007
Health care financing reform : a socio-economic
perspective
Lok Sang HO
lsho@ln.edu.hk
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp
Part of the Health Policy Commons
This Paper Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究中心 at Digital Commons @
Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Centre for Public Policy Studies : CPPS Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.
Recommended Citation
Ho, L. S. (2007). Health care financing reform: A socio-economic perspective (CPPS Working Paper Series No.187). Retrieved from
Lingnan University website: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp/88/
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
Centre for Public Policy Studies 
Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
No. 187 (Aug 07) CPPS 
 
 
Health Care Financing Reform:  
A Socio-Economic Perspective 
 
 
Lok Sang Ho 
 
 
   
 Lingnan University 
Hong Kong 
 
 
Health Care Financing Reform:  
A Socio-Economic Perspective 
 
 
Lok Sang Ho 
 
August 2007 
 
 
ã Lok Sang Ho 
 
Lok Sang Ho is Professor of Economics and Director of Centre for 
Public Policy Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre for Public Policy Studies 
Lingnan University 
Tuen Mun 
Hong Kong 
Tel: (852) 2616 7182 
Fax: (852) 2591 0690 
Email: cpps@LN.edu.hk 
http://www.LN.edu.hk/cpps/ 
 
 
CAPS and CPPS Working Papers are circulated to invite discussion 
and critical comment.  Opinions expressed in them are the author’s 
and should not be taken as representing the opinions of the Centres or 
Lingnan University.  These papers may be freely circulated but they 
are not to be quoted without the written permission of the author.  
Please address comments and suggestions to the author. 
 
 1 
Health Care Financing Reform: A Socio-Economic Perspective 
 
Lok Sang Ho* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper reviews some of the recent literature and experiences in 
healthcare reform in the light of the peculiarities of human nature.  The 
review suggests that successful healthcare financing reform boils down to 
working out a cost/risk-sharing formula between government and citizens 
that can effectively preserve the incentives for efficient utilization of 
healthcare resources and for preventive care, while limiting the financial 
risk of citizens.  The paper will also address issues arising from aging and 
redistributive concerns, as well as political and administrative feasibility.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A recent paper by Sidorenko and Butler (2007) reviewed the various efforts 
to provide health insurance among Asian Pacific countries.  They cited 
the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2001:21): “good 
population health is a critical input into poverty reduction, economic 
growth, and long-term development at the scale of whole societies.”  But 
health1 is also a crucial input in “household production,” which is the 
economist’s jargon for the process of turning consumption goods and 
services purchased in the market place into “consumption attributes,” such 
as nutrition and sensory pleasure, that directly affect people’s well being.2  
According to many studies (Veenhoven, 1991, Peiro, 2006), health appears 
to be an important determinant of happiness.3  Gruber and Mullainathan 
(2005) even found cigarette taxes conducive to happiness, and this 
apparently is because cigarette taxes reinforce the commitment to quit 
                                                 
* Lok Sang Ho is Director of Centre for Public Policy Studies, Lingnan University, Hong 
Kong. Email: Lsho@Ln.edu.hk 
1 Here health should refer to “functional health.”  This is the flow of functionally healthy 
time that an individual enjoys within a specific time period.  Duffy and MacDonnald(1990) 
investigated into the determinants of functional health for the elderly.  
2 One of the pioneers of the household production concept is Becker.  See Becker(1965). 
3 Causality is however notoriously difficult to establish.  For example, one authoritative 
result shows that happiness is inversely related to hypertension (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
2007).  One may ask if it is hypertension that make people less happy, or whether unhappy 
people develop hypertension. 
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smoking, and ultimately contribute to a healthier and happier life for 
smokers over the longer run.  
 
Today the healthcare systems in many countries are facing a crisis.  The 
crisis facing Americans is well known and attracted even more debate after 
Michael Moore’s controversial movie Sicko. Even the often-touted 
Singapore system had to cope with emerging problems with various 
reforms, which over time have added to the complexity of the system 
considerably (Taylor et.al. 2003).  Thus, on top of the better known 
Medisave, which was launched in 1984, a catastrophic insurance scheme 
called Medishield was introduced in 1990 to serve as a risk management 
tool, protecting the insured from excessive burden in the event a major 
illness struck.   To ensure the sustainability of Medishield, Singapore 
requires of patients payment in the form of deductibles and co-payments, 
and sets limits over claims per treatment, per policy year, and over one’s 
life time.  Singapore introduced the Medifund to assist the poor in 1993, 
and stipulated that only the interest proceeds from the endowment fund 
were to be used to help the eligible poor.  Singapore further introduced 
the Eldershield in 2002 to provide protection against the risk of severe 
disabilities when one gets old.  In Hong Kong, alarm had been raised time 
and again that the government-funded healthcare system is unsustainable 
(Hsiao et.al. 1999).  On the Chinese Mainland, where government 
funding for healthcare is minimal and hospitals are asked to procure its 
own finances through fees and charges, considerable anxiety pervades the 
population over unpredictable and often large medical expenditures (Liu 
and Mills, 2002; French, 2006), putting great pressure to reform the system.   
Across the Taiwan Strait, the introduction of a National Health Insurance 
plan in Taiwan was welcomed by the population, but had raised concern 
about sustainability and moral hazard problems,4 while the co-payme nt 
requirements also had raised concern about fairness (Cheng, 2003).5 
 
The fact is, there is a dilemma that faces most universal health insurance 
schemes or national health systems.  It is human nature that people are 
worried about great financial risks.  But if patients are protected from the 
bulk of the cost when health services are required, it is also human nature 
that they will lose some motive for preventive care and will tend to 
                                                 
4 Moral hazard is a term used in the insurance literature to describe how people respond to 
insurance by taking less preventive care(demand side moral hazard) or by providing more 
services than is appropriate(supply side moral hazard). 
5 Critics argue that the sick are already disadvantaged and often poor and should not be 
burdened with copayments. 
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over-utilize the system (“demand side moral hazard”).  Furthermore, 
when caregivers are asked to bill the insurance fund for the care they give 
to patients they may give more “care” than necessary (“supply side moral 
hazard”) and they may even bill it for care not given.6  Although there is 
little dispute that governments should provide a safety net to the needy, in 
an aging society, it is important that people should be motivated to take 
care of themselves and to save for their healthcare needs7 at an early age 
by arousing their cost consciousness.  The kind of universal health 
insurance as we know to date8 however blunts that cost consciousness, 
raising the possibility of a cost explosion in the future when people grow 
old.  The tendency for diabetes and obesity cases to develop among the 
younger population as observed in many countries is particularly 
worrying.9 
 
Section 2 will explore the reasons why healthcare reform has been so 
difficult and why many efforts at reforming healthcare have failed.  
Section 3 will discuss the key elements of a successful healthcare policy.  
Section 4 provides an argument for the public healthcare sector to cover 
only “basic care,” to implement marginal cost pricing for such services, 
and for the government to negotiate standard pricing for basic drugs with 
pharmaceutical companies, while leaving premium services and premium 
drugs entirely to the market.  Section 5 discusses a modified version of 
Ho’s Excessive Burden Insurance (Ho, 1997) designed specifically to 
address the aging issue.  Section 6 will discuss the concept of Lifetime 
Healthcare Supplement, which can go hand in hand with Excessive Burden 
Insurance to increase the choices available to citizens without exposing the 
government itself to excessive financial risk.  Section 7 looks into the 
subject of political and administrative feasibility, which inevitably will 
include distributive justice concerns.  Section 8 concludes the paper by 
observing that the key to successful healthcare reform lies in defining the 
roles of private and public caregivers in a way that reflects their 
comparative advantages and in combining the best features of a 
market-oriented system and those of a public healthcare system.  
 
                                                 
6 “Care” in quotation marks to highlight the fact that it may not be in the patient’s interest at 
all.  While living in Canada in the 70s the author read of multiple news reports about such 
fraudulent claims. 
7 We will argue that they should save for part of their healthcare needs when they get old.  
This is the “affordable share” of their healthcare cost.  See below.  
8  Typically these are in the form of “Fee Reducing” insurance.  See Appendix for a 
comparison with Excessive Burden Insurance. 
9 See Daviglus et.al.(2004) & http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-research/summaries/daviglus-bmi.jsp 
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2. Health Policy as a Socio-Economic and a Political Problem 
 
Many efforts at healthcare reform have failed because they fail to 
recognize the peculiarities of human nature, particularly people’s natural 
incentives and extreme risk aversion (psychological/ economic) and the 
peculiarities of the healthcare and insurance markets (economic),  
Pressured by different interest groups (political) and worried over 
implications on the public purse (economic), policy makers have often 
failed to build in features in the policy that directly address the incentive 
problem and the human need for peace of mind. (Ho, 1998, 2001b, 2006). 
A sustainable and high quality healthcare system requires providing the 
right incentives among all key stakeholders and getting the cooperation of 
all parties concerned.  Unfortunately, typically this is rendered very 
difficult because of political reasons.  Politicians may be wary of 
introducing cost-based user charges that may turn their voters away.  
They figure that voters will take the short view rather than the long view.  
Their own time horizon, too, seldom extends beyond one or two terms of 
office.  Then there are insurers, pharmaceutical companies, private 
doctors, lawyers, and others who are eager to defend or further their 
interests, all rendering a fair, longer term solution to the health policy 
problem “academic.”10  
 
Although public policy affects different stakeholders differently, it is 
possible to have a workable definition of “the public interest.”  Following 
Rawls (1971) and Ho (2001) we propose that the public interest is the ex 
ante interest of the “representative individual” as he confronts different 
possibilities: the representative individual being a hypothetical individual 
who faces equal probability of being anyone within the society.  We may 
perform a thought experiment as suggested by Rawls (1971).  Imagine 
that we could be a doctor; a healthy person or a patient; the shareholder of 
a pharmaceutical company; the shareholder of an insurance company; or 
someone not holding any stake in these companies; a rich person or a 
person of poor means; a fortunate one, or an unfortunate one: with 
probabilities equal to the percentage of these different people in the 
community.  We would ask, as we ponder over each policy proposal: if we 
were “behind a veil of ignorance” about our identity (Rawls, 1971), which 
                                                 
10 “The pharmaceutical and health products industry has spent more than $800 million in (US) 
federal lobbying and campaign donations at the federal and state levels in the past seven 
years.” See “Drug Lobby Second to None How the pharmaceutical industry gets its way in 
Washington”, The Centre for Public Integrity, posted July 7, 2005. 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/rx/report.aspx?aid=723 accessed August 10, 2007. 
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policy option would we prefer?  Thus public interest is the interest of 
society when vested interests are forgotten: there is no specific person or 
party to fend for or to please, but there is a need to fend for and to care for 
anyone in society in a probabilistic sense. 
 
Various surveys on the two sides of the Atlantic and elsewhere have shown 
that people are all deeply concerned about healthcare (Blendon, et.al., 1990; 
Mossialos, 1997, Blendon and Benson, 2001, Peiro, 2006) and 
unpredictable healthcare costs.  Various polls in China have indicated that 
healthcare and healthcare cost are one of the key concerns of the 
population.  Providing reliable needed care at an affordable cost is clearly 
conducive to happiness and deserves high priority in the social agenda in 
most countries. 
 
Understandably, many governments are worried about the rising burden of 
healthcare on the public purse.  However, while sustainability is a 
legitimate concern, a rise in the share of healthcare spending in GDP does 
not necessarily signal any problem, and may simply reflect the changing 
needs of society.  To control costs, many governments look upon the 
Singapore healthcare system as a model, as it demonstrably has succeeded 
in containing public expenditures on healthcare.  But with so many rules 
and restrictions all of which limit choice and potentially welfare, the 
Singapore model may not be the best option. 
 
The task facing a government concerned with maximizing the public 
interest is the daunting one of seeking the best deal for the representative 
individual while facing the fight to promote self interest by different 
interest groups:  from patient and consumer groups to doctors and HMOs 
to insurance companies and lawyers to pharmaceutical companies and their 
shareholders.  This paper argues that the government needs to define its 
role narrowly as providing just “basic care” at affordable cost, while 
leaving the market to take care of “premium care” as long as proper 
standards and accountability are maintained.  Defining what is covered 
under “basic care” will limit the cost exposure of the government and will 
give private players maximum room to play out their different roles 
without fear of unfair competition from the public sector.  Politically, by 
allowing pharmaceutical companies to charge market prices for “premium 
care” drugs, there is a better chance for the government to be able to 
negotiate affordable drug prices on the “basic care” list. 
 
 6 
The essence of healthcare financing reform, from this perspective, boils 
down to defining the role of the government appropriately and to working 
out a cost/risk-sharing formula between the government and the citizen that 
can effectively preserve the incentives for efficient utilization of healthcare 
resources and for preventive care, and thus to ensure sustainability.  
 
3. Key Elements of Reform 
 
Economists know well that correct pricing holds the key to economic 
efficiency. 11  Common folks know well that the dilemma of having to pay 
beyond one’s means or facing the serious consequences of substandard or 
inadequate care is the source of much agonizing both for the patient and 
for his immediate family members.  Recent analysis by Ho (2001, 2006) 
further suggests that the prospect of having to face such a dilemma has an 
immediate negative effect on happiness.12  Thus any viable healthcare 
financing package should include: 
(1)  a pricing policy that ensures fees and charges reflect marginal or 
direct costs of services;  
(2)  an insurance mechanism that ensures that patients never have to face 
the dilemma of either going broke or going without proper healthcare 
at a time when such care is crucial to preserving health or even 
survival.   
Apart from these basic considerations, providing more choice is assumed 
to be superior to providing less choice, unless the choices become 
confusing and lead to disorientation (Schwartz, 2004),.  Thus there is:  
(3)  an imperative to increase choices as long as the benefit of increasing 
choices exceeds the cost.  Finally,  
(4)  resources should be allocated into healthcare as long as the additional 
benefit exceeds the cost.  This is true for the government as well as 
for the individual. An appropriate amount of public revenue should be 
allocated for the prevention of illnesses and accidents, for the 
treatment of patients, for the training of healthcare professionals, and 
for research and development.  Cost benefit analysis needs to be 
performed to assess how much of each is optimal.  At the individual 
level, as long as prices are appropriate, we can leave the individual to 
make his own choice, unless a particular kind of behavior has 
                                                 
11 Economic efficiency means simply making the most out of what is available.  It requires 
producing at the least cost, allocating resources according to people’s choices, and 
consumption efficiency.  
12 This is called “prospective happiness.” 
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significant external effects on others, in which case government 
regulation will be necessary.    
 
While most countries continue to see an increase in the share of resources 
being devoted to healthcare there is evidence of wastefulness and 
inadequate resources being allocated to healthcare at the same time for 
many countries.  In China, doctors supplement their meager incomes by 
overcharging patients through drug sales or unnecessary services and 
procedures so as to obtain bonuses. The practice is encouraged by hospitals 
which are under-funded by the government and need extra income to make 
ends meet (Blumenthal, 2005).  Because lucrative fees can be charged on 
high-end services, Chinese hospitals over-invest in costly medical 
equipment, such as Comp uterized Tomography machines— the 30.6% 
ownership rate is even higher than that in major European cities and the 
US (IBM, 2006). 
 
4. Marginal Cost Pricing for Basic Care for Efficiency  
 
It is important to distinguish between basic care and premium care.13  For 
basic care, which is defined as the most cost-effective care to maintain 
normal health given the constraint of sustainability and universal 
accessibility, fees and charges need to be regulated and fixed at the 
marginal cost (the direct cost arising from a service) of the care.  This is 
necessary to minimize both demand side and supply side moral hazard.  
In general, charging below marginal cost may lead to waste and demand 
beyond what is optimal.  This is well documented by the famous Rand 
Health Insurance Experiment study (Newhouse, 1993).  Charging above 
marginal cost on the other hand makes providing a service profitable and 
may lead to supply-side moral hazard.  Given the importance of health 
and the need for timely care patients and information asymmetry, patients 
and their families tend to comply with suggestions made by their 
caregivers, especially when they have few alternatives to choose.14  
 
It is suggested that governments should pay for all fixed/overhead costs of 
basic care services, so that there will be no need for user charges to exceed 
marginal costs.  With charges covering direct costs, caregivers also will 
                                                 
13 This is crucially related to the question of public versus private provision, as pointed out by 
Lim (2005).  As well it is crucially related to the question of affordability: “the thought of 
denying a fellow human being access to the same level of health care because of his or her 
inability to pay, stirs deep emotions.”(p.461) 
14 Ho(1995) has documented how lucrative fees and charges had caused inappropriate care 
and waste in China.  A more recent study(IBM, 2006) also drew the same conclusion. 
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not undersupply services for financial reasons.  Successful control of 
supply-side moral hazard is an important reason why both the National 
Health Service of the UK and the Hong Kong Hospital Authority system 
are widely considered good value for money.  In both healthcare systems 
doctors as well as other healthcare professionals are paid a salary that 
allows a reasonable return for their human capital investment.  Salaried 
doctors would not like patients to revisit unless there is a professionally 
perceived need for it. 
 
While the charges for basic care should be regulated and set equal to 
marginal cost, the prices of premium services should be left entirely to the 
market.  By definition, patients opt for premium services and they do so 
only when they perceive good value. The government should not only 
leave premium care pricing alone, but should also avoid competing with 
private caregivers in providing such services.  It is unfair for the 
government, which has the authority to tax, to compete with private 
caregivers for profitable business.  When suppliers of healthcare services, 
including pharmaceutical companies, are thus allowed to earn more for 
premium services rendered, they will be in a better position to agree to 
concessionary pricing for “basic care” products and services.  Moreover, 
they will be in a better position to engage in research and development, and 
further improve their premium services. 
 
While public hospitals and clinics should not compete directly with them 
for profitable business, private healthcare providers should be allowed and 
even encouraged to offer basic care services.  But if their services are 
truly “basic” they should follow the government’s pricing scheme.  For 
such caregivers, since they are helping the government and are alleviating 
the public burden to fund healthcare infrastructure it may be argued that 
the government should provide some lump sum grants to defray part of 
their overhead costs. 
 
5. Excessive Burden Insurance for Protection 
 
If the public is worried about healthcare being excessively burdensome, 
then the universal Excessive Burden Insurance (Ho, 1997, 2001a) appears 
to be a logical policy response.  The idea of public healthcare based on an 
annual deductible has been implemented in Sweden, where a patient who 
has paid a total of SEK 900 in patient fees from the date of the first 
consultation is entitled to free medical care for the rest of a twelve-month 
period (Fact Sheets on Sweden, 2003, Swedish Institute).  But there the 
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fees as well as the annual deductible appear too low to serve the purpose of 
healthcare financing or that of moral hazard control.  Excessive Burden 
Insurance is an insurance scheme in the sense that each citizen is protected 
or “insured” against having to spend beyond his means in some sense.  
Under Excessive Burden Insurance the insured person pays the direct cost 
for services consumed up to a pre-set annual limit which is considered a 
fair and bearable contribution by the patient.  Beyond this “annual 
deductible” the government will offer complete protection for basic care.  
Of course, the coverage of basic care needs to be carefully defined. Under 
an EBI insurance, premiums may either be collected from the public 
individually or entirely paid for by the government.  Excessive Burden 
Insurance distinguishes itself from most national health insurance schemes 
in that, before the pre-set annual limit has been reached, citizens are 
expected to pay the direct cost of healthcare services.  A problem with 
many national health insurance plans is that they mitigate the incentive of 
citizens to take preventive care and that the effective under-pricing of 
health services often leads to waste and abuse.  Under Excessive Burden 
Insurance waste and abuse are minimized while any revenue collected 
through user charges is recycled back into basic healthcare.  Although 
beyond the pre-set limit all cost is absorbed by the government it is argued 
that those citizens who utilize health services so intensively are likely to 
have a good reason. 
 
Table 1 and Table 2 in the Appendix provide a numerical illustration to 
show that in order for a “fee-reducing” insurance program, which is typical 
of most national health insurance schemes, to significantly reduce the risk 
exposure to patients, as Excessive Burden Insurance does, the discount off 
the actual cost of medical care is likely to be as high as 90%.  This kind of 
discount, however, would significantly distort the perception of costs and 
will cause serious moral hazard. 
 
Finally, it is a well known fact that older people generally use healthcare 
services much more than younger people, although there can be a great 
variation from country to country (Hagist and Kotlikoff, 2005).15  To be 
fair to everybody and to encourage saving and a healthy life style at a 
young age, the annual pre-set limit (the annual “deductible”) should be 
raised for those beyond the age of 50 by some specific amount each year 
up to some socially agreeable amount.  Such arrangement would enable 
the government to collect more revenue that can be recycled back to the 
public healthcare system to provide timely quality healthcare for the aged.  
                                                 
15 Their Table 2 is reproduced as Table 3 in the Appendix.   
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Considering the fact that the healthcare expenditure-age profile has 
actually steepened following the introduction of a new health insurance 
law in 1996, and that a similar steepening has been observed in many other 
countries (Steinmann et.al. 2007), making people aware of the high cost of 
healthcare if their health should decline significantly when they get old 
may be the crucial step necessary to prevent the expansion of morbidity as 
discussed in Olshansky et. al. (1991) 
 
6. Lifetime Healthcare Supplement (LHS) for Greater Choice 
 
While conceptually “basic care” is “the most cost-effective care to 
maintain normal health” defining the boundary between basic care and 
premium care is not entirely a scientific exercise.  It depends on the 
expectations of the community, as well as the readiness of the community 
to fund healthcare.  Presumably, if the annual deductibles are higher, the 
government will collect more revenue from patients.  The coverage of 
basic care can be broader.   
 
In general, because care using the latest technology is usually very costly, 
the community may not be able to afford including certain expensive 
treatments/drugs as basic care, even if they are proven effective in 
restoring normal health/functioning.  Addressing this concern, the 
Lifetime Healthcare Supplement (LHS) is proposed as a cost-sharing 
arrangement to offer patients the opportunity to take advantage of these 
latest advances in medical knowledge with assistance, while limiting the 
cost exposure to the government.  Under this arrangement, the 
government will set aside some contingent funds for each member of the 
community in a LHS account in his name.  Patients can draw funds from 
this account to pay for any form of care as he sees fit, but they must match 
the withdrawals with their own funds according to a stipulated ratio.  
Moreover, since the funds put up by the government is fixed for the 
lifetime of each individual, if a patient draws funds now, he will have less 
available in the future.  Thus the lifetime fixed amount caps the 
contingent cost to the government and in addition helps preserve the 
incentive to use the resources wisely.  The matching requirement is like a 
co-payment in insurance to reduce moral hazard problems.  Because of 
the matching requirement and the availability of Excessive Burden 
Protection for basic care, only a fraction of the community will ever draw 
funds.  In addition it is also likely that cumulative lifetime withdrawals in 
the end will not exhaust the funds in the account.  What proportion of the 
population will draw funds from their LHS accounts and what proportion 
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of the funded amounts will be withdrawn are empirical questions that will 
be answered with experience. 
 
7. Political and Administrative Feasibility 
 
The suggestion that basic health care fees should be based on direct costing 
and that the annual deductible should rise from age 50 raises worry that it 
may not be politically feasible. This is on top of the worry that it might 
undermine access to care or might cause costly delays in getting care.  
These are valid concerns and need to be addressed.  
 
To mitigate the affordability problem under excessive burden insurance,16 
discounts on fees and reduced annual deductibles may be given those 
found to be poor.  Moreover, for those who are receiving welfare 
payments, an increase in their mo nthly stipends may go hand in hand with 
charging them a reduced fee.  The increase in the welfare stipend can in 
principle reduce the net increase in burden to as small as is desired. 
 
With the affordability issue taken care of, and with the promise of better, 
more timely and more reliable services in the offing, and on top of that 
with the offer of the Lifetime Healthcare Supplement—  there is a good 
chance that political feasibility will not be a problem. 
 
Administratively the proposal is easy to implement especially in light of 
today’s information technology.  Indeed Sweden has been implementing 
some kind of excessive burden protection for over a decade.  The 
proposed system will require setting up a separate central file for each 
eligible citizen.  Under this file will be recorded his medical history, 
blood type, what he is allergic to, as well as his “basic care” medical 
spending within the year.  The system will be automatically alerted when 
he has paid up his annual deductible.  From that time on till the end of the 
year the government will be responsible for all his basic care medical 
expenditures.   
 
The public healthcare system will provide basic healthcare only and will 
announce official basic care charges from time to time.  Private caregivers 
                                                 
16 Bundorf and Pauly(2006) found evidence that in the US one quarter to 3/4 of the uninsured 
can actually “afford” but did not choose to get coverage.  Perceived value for money, which 
may be affected by the insured person’s own perceived health, will affect enrollment.  
Without mandating health insurance, it is quite likely that some people will stay uninsured 
even when it is subsidized. 
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who opt to provide basic care will have to charge the same rates, but they 
have the option to provide better than basic care and to charge more, as 
well as to provide premium care.  In the case where caregivers provide 
better than basic care, only the official basic care charges will be recorded 
as insurable expenditures.  With authorization by the patient private 
caregivers will have access to the central file and will record his “basic 
care” expenses and treatment history as well.  The patient’s central file 
will therefore provide the basis of “seamless care” and will serve multiple 
purposes, including epidemiological studies that can prove crucial to public 
health. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Healthcare reform is on the agenda of almost every government.  Social 
scientists are in a unique position to inform policy makers in the reform 
process.  It is important that policy makers take full account of human 
nature when they go about designing the reform package: the human 
propensity to follow the natural course of incentives, the aversion to 
extreme risks, and the preference for autonomy.  If healthcare reform can 
reduce the worries of citizens it will immediately contribute to the 
happiness of the society.  If rules and restrictions are minimized and 
people are given a greater sense of autonomy when they conduct their lives 
happiness will be enhanced.  Reference to human nature will usually 
reveal why some healthcare reform fails.  Moral hazard is a case in point.  
The challenge is to combine market-oriented options, which will make 
people more cost-conscious, with public provision, which can reduce risk 
and information cost and can better ensure quality, innovatively so that 
healthcare reform works with rather than against human nature. 
 
While many policy makers are right to be worried about containing costs, a 
rising percentage of the GDP being spent on healthcare does not 
necessarily signal a problem.  It may simply reflect society’s new 
priorities, changing demographics, and the latest advances in technology.  
Sustainability, however, is a valid concern.  One key reason why national 
health insurance systems may not be sustainable is the demand-side moral 
hazard problem caused by the under-pricing of key services and the 
supply-side moral hazard problem caused by the profitability of rendering 
services by caregivers.  Containing the moral hazard problem is 
fundamental to achieving sustainability.  Pricing “basic care” at or near 
true marginal cost (direct cost) must be an important component of a 
sustainable healthcare system.  For premium care, to the extent that it is 
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consumed voluntarily and that it is provided by the free market without 
subsidy, pricing should not be regulated.   
 
Given the citizens’ concern for excessive burden, some form of excessive 
burden protection is logical.  To an extent this is already in place in many 
countries.  The Medishield in Singapore for catastrophic insurance is a 
case in point.  Excessive burden insurance as discussed in this paper, 
however, is more flexible in that it covers not only specified illnesses but 
all basic care expenses up to the yearly pre-set limit.   
 
The idea of a high deductible health insurance plan is also already quite 
well known, particularly in the United States, where High Deductible 
Health insurance Plans (HDHPs) are often paired with a Health Savings 
Account.17  The purported advantages of such plans by way of reducing 
the cost of insurance premiums and of reducing waste are also well known.  
However, HDHPs have been criticized as undermining access to care and 
as failing to cause a dent in the trend for rising health insurance premiums  
(Davis, Doty, and Ho, 2005).  Regarding access, a problem with the 
American situation is that there is no regulation of basic care charges and 
there is typically a co-payment of 20 per cent even after the deductible 
amount.  Because HDHPs account for only about 8% of all private 
insurance plans it is not surprising that they do not have any noticeable 
effect on overall costs.  The observation that HDHP has effectively 
reduced access suggests that it is effectively reducing utilization of health 
services and should therefore reduce overall costs, provided that it is 
widely used.  Instead of the fear that HDHP may fail to reduce overall 
costs, then, the fear is that it may be reducing warranted care.   
 
To alleviate excessive burden for the poor and in order not to undermine 
access, we have suggested that eligible persons passing a means test may 
enjoy lower fees and lower annual deductibles.  The appropriate discount 
has to be determined through consultation and consensus, and may be 
supplemented by a greater stipend for those who currently receive welfare 
payments.  Efficiency considerations dictate that no one should be totally 
exempt from healthcare charges.  Thus redistribution and resource 
allocation are two different and equally worthy objectives and will require 
two different policy instruments to achieve them.   
 
 
                                                 
17 Unlike the mandatory health savings accounts in Singapore, US Health Savings Accounts 
are voluntary with contributions encouraged by tax advantages. 
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Appendix  
 
Population of 100,000 is assumed.  Social cost of healthcare for the 
unfortunate in a year assumed to be $100,000 that for the fortunate $10,000 
(10 being the “Misfortune Multiple”).  Individuals pay full direct costs of 
care up to the cap under Excessive Burden Insurance.  “Risk ratio” is 
defined as Maximum Cost to Individual divided by Minimum Cost to 
Individual.  Expected cost = Sum of Minimum Cost and Maximum Cost 
weighted by probabilities.  “Premiums” are the amounts needed to fund 
the insurance program, ignoring administrative costs.  Table 1 shows that 
the risk ratio is less than 2 for annual deductibles of $20,000 under 
Excessive Burden Insurance.  Table 2 shows that if the risk ratio is to be 
reduced to less than 2 under Fee-Reducing Insurance, the fee reduction will 
have be equal to a 90% discount.  Moreover, at 100% discount (i.e., no 
charges at all), stakes under FRI would be identical with stakes under EBI 
with an annual cap at $10,000.  Given human nature as it is, this is likely 
to reduce preventive care and cause serious moral hazard problems. 
 
Appendix Table 1: Excessive Burden Insurance when misfortune multiple = 10 and probability 
of misfortune = 1% 
Amount of 
Annual 
Deductible D 
( The “Cap”) 
Charges 
paid by 
fortunate 
Charges 
paid by 
unfortunate 
Premium 
Required 
Minimum 
Individual 
Pays 
Maximum 
Individual 
Pays 
Individual’s 
Expected 
Cost 
Risk 
Ratio 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)=(f)/(e) 
10000 10000 10000 900 10900 10900 10900 1.00  
20000 10000 20000 800 10800 20800 10900 1.93  
30000 10000 30000 700 10700 30700 10900 2.87  
40000 10000 40000 600 10600 40600 10900 3.83  
50000 10000 50000 500 10500 50500 10900 4.81  
70000 10000 70000 400 10400 60400 10900 5.81  
60000 10000 60000 300 10300 70300 10900 6.83  
80000 10000 80000 200 10200 80200 10900 7.86  
90000 10000 90000 100 10100 90100 10900 8.92  
100000 10000 100000 0 10000 100000 10900 10.00  
Note: “Premium Required” is calculated as total healthcare costs minus fees collected divided by the 
population.  Premiums are assumed to be collected in these examples but in practice may be 
funded from the general revenue. 
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Appendix Table 2: Fee Reducing Insurance when Misfortune Multiple = 10 and Probability of 
Misfortune = 1%, assuming behavior is neutral, i.e., not affected by the high premiums. 
Discount 
Factor d 
Charges Paid 
by Fortunate 
Charges 
Paid by 
Unfortunate 
Premium 
Required 
Minimum 
Individual 
Pays 
Maximum 
Individual 
Pays 
Individual's 
Expected 
cost 
Risk 
Ratio 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)=(f)/(e) 
10% 9000 90000 1090 10090 91090 10900 9.03  
20% 8000 80000 2180 10180 82180 10900 8.07  
30% 7000 70000 3270 10270 73270 10900 7.13  
40% 6000 60000 4360 10360 64360 10900 6.21  
50% 5000 50000 5450 10450 55450 10900 5.31  
60% 4000 40000 6540 10540 46540 10900 4.42  
70% 3000 30000 7630 10630 37630 10900 3.54  
80% 2000 20000 8720 10720 28720 10900 2.68  
90% 1000 10000 9810 10810 19810 10900 1.83  
100% 0 0 10900 10900 10900 10900 1.00  
Note: “Premium Required” is calculated as total healthcare costs minus fees collected divided by the 
population. 
 
Appendix Table 3: Healthcare Benefit-Age Profiles for 10 OECD Countries 
Source: Hagist and Kotlikoff (2005), Table 2. 
